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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 354-82  
18 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer for NESAs

SUBJECT: Libya Planning: 19 January Breakfast with SecState

1. As reflected in the Memorandum for the Record of the 15 January Working Group Meeting prepared by Helene Boatner, there are currently a number of papers being prepared for the next Libyan National Security Council deliberations. The Libyan Working Group has scheduled completion dates for these papers in time for a 4 February NSC meeting, although I note this meeting is now tentatively scheduled for 21 January.

2. The papers will, inter alia, examine current Libyan behavior, make recommendations on the continued validity of economic and military steps previously decided upon, evaluate the current Libyan internal situation, and examine the regional impact of currently proposed courses of action.

3. Three lines of thought are identifiable in the Libyan Working Group and Task Force:

- a. Qadhafi has responded more than had been anticipated to actions and threats already done, and he is "on the run."

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Destabilizing activities  
in Sudan and Somalia continue apace.


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4. I have the following observations:

- a. I do not feel that economic sanctions should proceed without further provocation. As analyzed in SNIE 36.5-2-81: Libya: Impact on Economic Sanctions, the range of sanctions will not have an appreciable economic impact, and the evidence simply does not verify that he is "on the run" from such symbolic actions. He is, however, worried.



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- c. Although a study is forthcoming on this subject, sufficient attention has not been given thus far to the regional impact of a military move on our part which was not clearly provoked. A full consideration of this aspect of the problem does not rule out such action on our part, but does tend to inject a note of caution against precipitous action.

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